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ABSTRACT 
 
What images of judging did the Kagan confirmation process project?   
 
My response to this question begins with a brief overview of existing public 
perceptions of the Supreme Court.  I argue that a large portion of the public sees 
the justices as impartial arbiters who can be trusted to rule fairly.  At the same 
time, a large portion of the public also sees the justices as political actors who 
are wrapped up in partisan disputes.  Given these prevailing public views, we 
should expect the Kagan confirmation process to transmit contradictory images 
of judicial decisionmaking, with a portrait of judging as a matter of reason and 
principle vying for attention with a picture of judging as a political enterprise. 
 
Second, I identify the different appearances of judicial action actually at play in 
the Kagan confirmation process by assessing all confirmation-related news 
articles, editorials, opinion pieces, and blog posts published in the Washington 
Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times.  I find that the 
confirmation coverage in the three newspapers conveys a contradictory mix of 
images that closely corresponds to the contradictory views of the Court already 
held by large numbers of Americans.   
 
Finally, I consider the significance of the Janus-faced public beliefs about the 
Supreme Court.  I acknowledge the ways in which political perceptions can chip 
away at judicial legitimacy, but I also argue that the public’s competing views 
may ultimately have a stable co-existence.  If we believe that individuals 
generally place contradictory demands on the courts, calling for an objectively 
fair system and at the same time seeking a guarantee that their own side will 
prevail, then a judiciary that appears at once to be governed by impartial 
principle and by partisan preference may cohere.   
                                                        
†  Paul E. and Hon. Joanne F. Alper ’72 Judiciary Studies Professor, Syracuse University.  I thank 
Shannon Johanni and Ken Williams for their excellent research assistance. 
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One of the lighter moments in the Supreme Court confirmation process 
last summer occurred during the second day of hearings before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.  Senator Arlen Specter asked the nominee Elena Kagan if 
she thought Supreme Court oral arguments should be broadcast on television.  
Kagan warmly supported the idea and she outlined the positive effects that 
televised arguments would have on the public as well as on the Court itself.  
Kagan then identified a final consequence of placing cameras before the high 
bench:  “It means that I would have to get my hair done more often, Senator 
Specter.”1
Kagan’s comment provided comic relief and (perhaps inadvertently) 
pointed toward an important fact about the judicial process:  appearances matter 
a great deal for courts.
  
2  Scholars have frequently argued that public confidence 
in the judiciary depends not only on the actual results of court rulings but also 
the ability of judges to convey the impression that their decisions are driven by 
the impersonal requirements of legal principle.3
                                                        
1  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Why Kagan Supports Broadcasting Oral Arguments, NEW YORK TIMES (June 
29, 2010, 3:56 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/why-kagan-supports-
broadcasting-court-arguments. 
  The public cares about how 
judges look.  The avoidance of actual judicial improprieties is necessary to secure 
2  For an account of judicial appearances in the United States and an analysis of their 
significance, see KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL—EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT:  ACCEPTABLE 
HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW (2010).   I draw on arguments from my book throughout this 
article. 
3  See generally James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa Baird, On the Legitimacy of 
National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 343–58 (1998); Trevor L. Brown & Charles R. 
Wise, Constitutional Courts and Legislative-Executive Relations: The Case of Ukraine, 119 POL. 
SCI. Q. 143, 143-69 (2004). 
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judicial legitimacy but it is not sufficient; judges must also visibly appear to play 
the role of neutral arbiter in order to reduce the probability of actual bias and to 
maintain popular support.4
The importance of appearances has long been evident in the codes of 
judicial conduct.  As Charles Geyh has observed, the first Canons of Judicial 
Ethics, created in 1924, paid significant attention to questions of appearance:  
one canon declared directly, 
 
that a judge’s official conduct should be ‘free from... the appearance of 
impropriety,’ [while] eleven other canons cautioned judges to avoid 
conduct that could create ‘suspicion’ of misbehavior or ‘misconceptions’ of 
the judicial role that might ‘appear’ or ‘seem’ to interfere with judicial 
duties, or that could ‘create the impression’ of bias.5
 
   
The original concern for judicial appearances remains central to the modern 
judicial conduct codes now established in all fifty states.6  The same concern for 
maintaining the propriety of judicial appearances can also be found in the federal 
code.7
The widely recognized importance of judicial appearances suggests two 
questions:  What images of the courts and judicial decisionmaking were 
 
                                                        
4  For evidence that the appearance of judicial bias reflects the presence of actual bias, see Chris 
W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, The Effect of Campaign Contributions on Judicial Decisionmaking 
(Feb. 4, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337668. 
5  Charles Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in the Courts in an Age of Individual Rights and 
Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 21, 29 (Keith 
J. Bybee ed., 2007). 
6  Id. at 30-32. 
7  See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A-Ch02.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 29, 2010). 
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conveyed by the Kagan confirmation process?  What is the significance of these 
images?  Whether one thinks that the confirmation process is a good way of 
identifying qualified nominees or is merely a “waste of everyone’s time,”8  it is 
undeniably true that Supreme Court confirmations offer a highly public display of 
claims about how the Court works and what counts as a good justice.  A day 
may come when the Court’s oral arguments (and Justice Kagan’s hair) are a 
staple of the television broadcast schedule.  Until that day arrives, however, it is 
fair to say that one of the most prominent public discussions of the Court 
happens when a vacancy on the high bench is being filled.9
In this Article, I examine the images of judging generated by the Kagan 
confirmation process.  I develop my argument in three sections.  In the first 
section, I provide a brief overview of existing public perceptions of the Supreme 
Court.  I argue that a large portion of the public sees the justices as impartial 
arbiters who can be trusted to rule fairly.  At the same time, a large portion of 
  If we are interested 
in identifying and evaluating how the Court appears to the American people, 
then the confirmation process – beginning with the hearings in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and ending with the full Senate’s confirmation vote – merits 
careful study.   
                                                        
8  Ronald Dworkin, The Temptation of Elena Kagan, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (July 22, 
2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/aug/19/temptation-elena-kagan.  
9  Confirmation processes do not typically dominate the news, but they can draw significant 
public attention, at least for a limited period.  Polls conducted during the Kagan confirmation, for 
example, showed about 40% of those surveyed were paying close attention to the process.  See 
Jennifer Agiesta, Majority to Back Kagan Confirmation as Interest Wanes, WASHINGTON POST (July 
20, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-
numbers/2010/07/majority_back_kagan_confirmati.html. 
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the public also sees the justices as political actors who are wrapped up in 
partisan disputes.  To the extent that the confirmation process is consistent with 
prevailing public views, we should expect the process to transmit contradictory 
images of judicial decisionmaking, with a portrait of judging as a matter of 
reason and principle vying for attention with a picture of judging as a political 
enterprise. 
In the second section of the Article, I identify the different appearances of 
judicial action at play in the Kagan confirmation process by assessing all 
confirmation-related news articles, editorials, opinion pieces, and blog posts 
published in the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles 
Times.  I find that the confirmation coverage in the three newspapers conveys a 
contradictory mix of images that closely corresponds to the contradictory views 
of the Supreme Court already held by large numbers of Americans.  Thus the 
confirmation process seems to have reaffirmed and reinforced existing public 
perceptions. 
In the final section of the Article, I consider the significance of the Janus-
faced public beliefs about the Supreme Court.  One can certainly argue that the 
political view of the Court will undermine the belief that the justices are impartial 
arbiters, inexorably leading to the conclusion that members of the Court are 
simply political agents hiding their partisan agenda under a cover of law.  I 
acknowledge the ways in which political perceptions can chip away at judicial 
legitimacy, but I also argue that the public’s competing views may ultimately 
 5 
have a stable co-existence.  If we believe that individuals generally place 
contradictory demands on the courts, calling for an objectively fair system and at 
the same time seeking a guarantee that their own side will prevail, then a 
judiciary that appears at once to be governed by impartial principle and by 
partisan preference begins to make sense.  This is by no means to say that such 
a paradoxical system is equitable or just.  But it may well be the system that best 
suits our conflicting desires. 
 
I. Public Views of the Supreme Court 
The conventional understanding of judicial decisionmaking requires judges 
to be shielded from politics and allowed to render decisions based on an 
impartial reading of the law.10  This does not mean, of course, that judges must 
approach controversies without any pre-existing beliefs about what the law 
requires.  As a practical matter, judges inevitably come to the bench with some 
preconceived legal views.  The conventional expectation of judicial impartiality 
does not ask judges to abandon their legal preconceptions, so much as it calls 
upon them to not let preconceptions “harden into prejudgments,” preventing 
them from giving fair weight to the facts, law, and arguments that will be 
presented in the disputes before them.11
                                                        
10  See generally ABA Comm. on the 21st Century Judiciary, Informal Report, Justice in Jeopardy 
(July 2003) [hereinafter Justice in Jeopardy], available at 
http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2010). 
  The American Bar Association 
11  Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 181, 211 (2004). 
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considers this ideal of judicial impartiality to be so broadly shared that it is an 
“enduring principle.” 
Judges occupy the role of umpires in an adversarial system of justice; 
their credibility turns on their neutrality.  To preserve their neutrality, they 
must neither prejudge matters that come before them, nor harbor bias for 
or against parties in those matters.  They must, in short, be impartial, if 
we are to be governed by the rule of law rather than by judicial whim.12
 
 
Public opinion surveys suggest that most of the American public sees the 
Supreme Court as living up to this conventional expectation of judicial 
impartiality.  Numerous studies demonstrate that the Court receives a significant 
degree of public goodwill because it is generally thought to be an even-handed 
guarantor of basic democratic values for all.13  Polls show that 66% of Americans 
trust the Court to operate in the best interests of the American people either “a 
great deal” or “a fair amount,” and that 75% of the public either “agree or 
strongly agree” that the Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are 
right for the country as a whole.14
                                                        
12  Justice in Jeopardy, supra note 10, at 9. 
  Moreover, the Court is, according to most 
people, properly insulated from the machinations of the other branches of 
13  See generally Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the 
Supreme Court, 36 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 635, 635-64 (1992); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & 
Lester Kenyatta Spence, Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. 
OF POL. SCI. 354, 354–76 (2003) [hereinafter Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes]; James L. Gibson, 
The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 507, 507-38 (2007) [hereinafter Gibson, Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court]. 
14  Judicial Survey Results, Annenberg Public Policy Center, Public Understanding of and Support 
for the Courts 2007 (Oct. 17, 2007), 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey/Judicial_Findi
ngs_10-17-2007.pdf.  
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government.  When asked whether federal judges should be subject to greater 
political control by elected officials, over two-thirds of those surveyed said no.15
Yet, even though solid majorities believe that the Supreme Court makes 
fair decisions and impartially advances general welfare, a large number of 
Americans also believe that members of the Court are influenced by politics.  
Some of the very same opinion studies that show broad belief in the Court’s 
good offices also indicate a widely shared view that the Court operates with too 
little regard for either legal principles or impartiality, with a near majority of 
respondents agreeing that the Court is “too mixed up in politics.”
 
16  A majority 
(62%) of the public agrees that judicial decisionmaking should not be affected at 
all by whether a justice is a political liberal or a political conservative, but a 
significant number of Americans (43%) also believes that political ideology 
actually has a “large impact” on Court decisions.17  Thus it is not surprising to 
find that the public often rates the Court in partisan terms, routinely evaluating 
Court performance from the perspective of individual party affiliation.18
                                                        
15  Poll: Americans Don’t Want Politicians Constraining Judges, CNN.COM (Oct. 28, 2006, 9:01 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/27/activist.judges.   
  Positive 
16  See Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes, supra note 13, at 358; see also Gibson, Legitimacy of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 13, at 519.  See also generally James L. Gibson, Gregory A. 
Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing 
Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187, 187-201 (2005); James 
L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Supreme Court Nominations, Legitimacy Theory and the 
American Public:  A Dynamic Test of the Theory of Positivity Bias (July 4, 2007), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=998283. 
17  John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Judicial Behavior and Public Opinion: Popular Expectations 
Regarding Factors That Influence Supreme Court Decisions, 23 POL. BEHAV. 181, 185 (2001). 
18  Thirteen polls conducted by the Gallup Poll News Service from 2000 through 2007 show that 
Americans’ overall ratings of the Court are clearly related to their party affiliation.  See Gallup Poll 
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opinions of the Court have been shown to fall among Democrats and 
conservative Republicans when the former find leading decisions to be too 
conservative and the latter find decisions not to be conservative enough.19  And 
when asked what sort of judge is most likely to let personal beliefs influence 
legal decisions, 40% of those polled said liberal judges, 39% said conservative 
ones, and 13% thought that both were equally likely to do so.20
In the final section of this Article, I will consider how the public’s 
conflicting views of the Supreme Court – views that take the Court to be at once 
an institution of impartial principle and an arena of political bias – can be said to 
relate to one another.
  For many 
members of the public, the overwhelming prevalence of conventional talk about 
impartial and principled judicial decisionmaking does not prevent judging from 
looking like a matter of politics, pure and simple. 
21
                                                                                                                                                                     
News Service, Slim Majority of Americans Approve of the Supreme Court (Sept. 26, 2007), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/28798/Slim-Majority-Americans-Approve-Supreme-Court.aspx.  For 
polling data from 2005 through 2010 that also shows persistent partisan evaluation of the 
Supreme Court, see Pew Research Center for People and the Press, Republicans Less Positive 
Toward Supreme Court (July 9, 2010), http://people-press.org/report/632. 
  As an initial matter, however, a general understanding 
of public perceptions provides a useful basis for generating expectations about 
the appearances of judging broadcast by the Kagan confirmation process.   
19  Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Supreme Court’s Image Declines as 
Nomination Battles Loom (June 15, 2005), http://people-press.org/report/247/supreme-
courtsimage-declines-as-nomination-battle-looms. 
20  Susan Page, What Americans Want in O’Connor Court Vacancy, USA TODAY (July 13, 2005, 
11:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-07-13-court-cover_x.htm.  
21  For the argument that public perceptions of both state judges and judges in general are 
similarly split into contradictory camps, see Bybee, supra note 2, at 6-10, 16-18.   
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Thus to the degree that the confirmation process is consistent with 
prevailing public beliefs, we should expect Senate hearings and debate to 
generate contradictory images of Supreme Court justices as neutral arbiters and 
as political actors.22
                                                        
22  Reasoning along these lines, I wrote a short article outlining expectations for the confirmation 
process that was published as the Judiciary Committee hearings began.  See Keith J. Bybee, 
Kagan’s Confirmation:  Conflicting Imagery, JURIST (June 28, 2010), 
http://jurist.org/forum/2010/06/kagans-confirmation-conflicting-imagery.php.  I draw from this 
article in the above paragraph in the text. 
  On the one hand, we should anticipate that there will be 
efforts to present the activity of judging as a matter of impartial principle, 
reason, and restraint.  The most extended articulation of this conventional ideal 
of judging is most likely to come from the nominee herself.  On the other hand, 
we should also anticipate that confirmation process will appear to be a matter of 
politicians and pressure groups competing to install ideological fellow travelers 
on the bench.  We should expect this second image of judging to be framed in 
terms of the conventional ideals of endorsed by the nominee.  That is, we can 
expect that everyone involved in the process will decry the influence of politics 
on the high bench.  Senators will deny that they are applying any kind of 
ideological litmus test and will insist that they are simply supporting judicial 
nominees who will adhere to the law.  And, yet, even as participants in the 
confirmation process extol the standard judicial virtues, we should anticipate a 
clear message indicating that most participants actually want something quite 
different:  rather than impartiality and open-mindedness, they seek a person 
who will reliably advance issues of interest to important political constituencies.  
 10 
 
II.  Images of Judicial Action in the Confirmation Process 
What images of judging did the Kagan confirmation process in fact 
produce?  In order to gain some leverage on this question, I examined all 
confirmation-related news articles, editorials, opinion pieces, and blog posts 
published in the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles 
Times from the start of the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on June 28, 
2010, until the final Senate vote on August 5, 2010.  The material from the three 
newspapers was gathered using the built-in search functions at each paper’s 
website.  The name “Kagan” was selected as the basic search term because it 
not only established outer limits on the search (the name is somewhat specific to 
the confirmation process during the relevant time period), but also promised to 
deliver a comprehensive set of items.  Table 1 displays the search results, with 
coverage categorized by type in order to give a sense of what the individual 
newspapers published as well as to indicate the overall distribution of material. 
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Table 1: Newspaper Coverage of Kagan Confirmation Process, 6/28/10-8/5/1023
Newspapers 
 
 
News Articles 
 
Blog Posts 
 
Editorials & 
Opinion 
Total 
 
Los Angeles Times 19 15 5 39 
New York Times 22 44 10 76 
Washington Post 41 57 24 122 
     Total 82 116 39 237 
 
 
 
As the table indicates, the Washington Post offered the greatest amount 
of coverage, a result of the fact that the confirmation process was a “hometown” 
event for the newspaper.  The table also indicates that the greatest amount of 
coverage overall came in the form of blog posts.  The high number of such posts 
reflects the ease of blogging and should not be considered a measure of 
comprehensive reporting.  Many blog posts were quite short:  a number were 
limited a single breaking development (such as a senator announcing how she 
planned to vote on the confirmation) or to conveying a humorous aside.  Other 
blog posts were little more than a list of links to confirmation news articles to be 
found in the day’s newspaper or elsewhere on the web.  On the whole, the news 
articles and opinion pieces tended to be substantially longer and more detailed 
than the blog posts.24
In analyzing the material, my goal was to identify the images of judging 
projected by the entire confirmation coverage in the three newspapers.  I did not 
 
                                                        
23  Compiled by Author. 
24  The news articles and opinion pieces did, of course, significantly differ from one another in 
tone and style. 
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suppose that any single reader would read all of the coverage offered by any one 
outlet.  Instead, I reasoned that the totality of material published by the 
newspapers would be a fair sample of the complete universe of confirmation 
coverage generated by all media.  To learn how three large newspapers framed 
the confirmation process for their readers is, I would argue, to gain a good 
understanding how the media as a whole represented Kagan’s journey from 
committee hearings to the final vote. 
With the description of the newspaper material and of my research 
rationale in mind, we can address a re-formulated version of the question with 
which this section began:  What images of judging were projected by the 
Washington Post, New York Times, and Los Angeles Times coverage of the 
Kagan confirmation process?25
All three newspapers clearly conveyed the impression that judicial 
decisionmaking is a matter of impartial principle, and did so primarily by 
reporting the words of Kagan herself.  A number of Kagan’s comments came 
from the exchanges the nominee had with the Senators on the Judiciary 
Committee, where she repeatedly insisted that judging is a modest activity 
restricted to the impartial gauging of arguments and evidence in each case.   
 
                                                        
25  Please note that in the following discussion of the newspapers’ coverage I cite only some of 
the published items that verify each of the claims I make in the text.  I have opted for illustrative 
article citation since exhaustive citation (for example, listing all the articles reproducing the same 
quotation from Kagan) would greatly lengthen each footnote without good reason. 
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• “As a judge, you are on nobody’s team.  As a judge, you are an 
independent actor.”26
• “I’m sure that everybody [on the Supreme Court] is acting in good 
faith.  You wouldn’t want the judicial process to become in any way 
a bargaining process or a logrolling process.  You wouldn’t want 
people to trade with each other – you know, ‘You’ll vote this way 
and I’ll vote that way, and then we can… get some unanimous 
decisions.’”
  
27
• “[Congress] ought to be the policymakers for the nation.  The 
courts have an important role to play, but it’s a limited role.  It’s 
essentially sort of policing the boundaries and making sure that 
Congress doesn’t overstep its role, doesn’t violate individual rights 
or interfere with other parts of the government system.”
 
28
                                                        
26  Kagan Draws Mixed Reactions from Senate Judiciary Committee, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 30, 
2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/30/nation/la-na-kagan-hearing-react-20100701. 
 
27  Robert Barnes & Amy Goldstein, Kagan Finished Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, 
WASHINGTON POST (July 1, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/30/AR2010063000369.html. 
28  Adam Liptak, Kagan Reminds Senators:  Legislation Is Your Job, NEW YORK TIMES (July 2, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/us/politics/02assess.html; see also Confirm Elena 
Kagan, NEW YORK TIMES (June 30, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/opinion/01thu1.html; The Republicans and the 
Constitution, NEW YORK TIMES (July 19, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/20/opinion/20tue1.html. 
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• “You shouldn’t want a judge who will tell you that she will reverse a 
decision without listening to arguments and without reading the 
briefs and without talking to colleagues.”29
 The image of judge as impartial arbiter was also evident in Kagan’s 
opening statement to the Judiciary Committee, in which Kagan explained how 
her experience in various settings taught her a set of lessons about the 
neutrality, principle, reason, and restraint of the Court.  On the basis of these 
lessons, Kagan pledged, “to listen hard to every party before the Court and to 
each of my colleagues . . . [to] work hard . . . [and to] do my best to consider 
every case impartially, modestly, with commitment to principle, and in 
accordance to law.”
 
30
The newspaper coverage also managed to communicate an ideal of 
impartial judging when it was not directly reporting Kagan’s words.  Some pieces 
offered defenses of Kagan’s claims to impartiality and restraint, presenting the 
nominee as charting a principled course throughout the Judiciary Committee 
hearings.
  
31
                                                        
29  James Oliphant, Kagan Slips on Fruits and Vegetables in Senate Panel Questioning, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (July 1, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/01/nation/la-na-kagan-
hearings-20100701.   
  Various editorials and opinion columns appealed to Kagan as a 
30  Elena Kagan’s Opening Statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 
28, 2010, 3:38 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2010/06/elna-kagan-judiciary-
statement-supreme-court.html; see also Michael Muskal, Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan 
Vows to Work Impartially, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 28, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/28/nation/la-na-elena-kagan-supreme-court-20100628. 
31  See Robert Barnes, High Court Nominee’s Cautious Answers Frustrate Senators, WASHINGTON 
POST (July 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/03/AR2010070302216.html; Confirm Elena Kagan, WASHINGTON POST 
(July 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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person seriously committed to legal principle, and attempted to persuade her to 
adopt one jurisprudential philosophy or another.32  And still other articles zeroed-
in on Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, portraying his support of Kagan as an 
indication that the confirmation process turned on the question of whether the 
nominee had the knowledge, prudence, and temperament necessary for 
impartial judgment.33
The image of impartial judicial decisionmaking was not, however, the only 
image to be found in the newspapers.  Indeed, the image of the impartial jurist 
was not even the most common vision of judging presented by the coverage.  
The far more frequent rendering of judicial action centered on politics.  For many 
Republican senators, the clearest example of the political judge was Kagan 
herself.  From the outset, Republicans tended to “cast Kagan as an 
inexperienced, progressive political operative who would work to preserve the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
dyn/content/article/2010/07/03/AR2010070302694.html; E.J. Dionne, Jr., A Judicial Change to 
Believe In, WASHINGTON POST (July 5, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/04/AR2010070403846.html. 
32  Jeffrey Rosen, Brandeis’s Seat, Kagan’s Responsibility, NEW YORK TIMES (July 2, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/opinion/04rosen.html; Jonathan Rauch, A ‘Kagan Doctrine’ 
on Gay Marriage, NEW YORK TIMES (July 2, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/opinion/03rauch.html; Katrina Vanden Heuvel, Retiring 
Chief Justice Roberts’s Umpire Analogy, WASHINGTON POST (June 28, 2010, 5:16 PM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/06/retiring_chief_justice_roberts.html. 
33  Dana Milbank, Lindsey Graham Stands Apart From Other Republican Senators on Kagan Vote, 
WASHINGTON POST (July 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/20/AR2010072005445.html; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Panel 
Backs Kagan Nomination, With One Republican Vote, NEW YORK TIMES (July 20, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/us/21kagan.html; David G. Savage, Elena Kagan Approved 
by Senate Judiciary Committee in 13-6 Vote, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 21, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/21/nation/la-na-kagan-vote-20100721.  For a similar 
approach that focuses on participants other than Graham, see Aaron Blake, Bush Administration 
Lawyers Praise Kagan, WASHINGTON POST (July 1, 2010), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/07/bush-administration-lawyers-pr.html. 
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president’s policy agenda once on the high court rather than serve as an 
objective jurist.”34  For example, in announcing his decision to vote against 
Kagan, Senator Orrin Hatch called her “a skilled political lawyer” and criticized 
her for supporting jurists that Hatch considered to be activists.  “The law must 
control the judge; the judge must not control the law,” Hatch argued.35
I believe she does not have the gifts and the qualities of mind or 
temperament that one must have to be a justice…. [Kagan would be] an 
activist, liberal progressive, politically minded judge who will not be happy 
simply to decide cases but will seek to advance her causes under the 
guise of judging.
  Senator 
Jeff Sessions reached the same conclusion:   
36
 
  
Most Democratic senators countered Republican criticism of Kagan by 
characterizing her as an exemplar of conventional judicial ideals (as Senator 
Patrick Leahy put it, Kagan will “do her best to consider every case impartially, 
modestly, and with commitment to principle and in accordance with law.”37
                                                        
34  James Oliphant, Senate Begins Debate Over Supreme Court Nominee Kagan, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Oliphant, Senate Begins Debate], 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/03/nation/la-na-kagan-nomination-20100804.  
).  
Democrats then re-focused the deflected criticism of political judging onto the 
conservative justices sitting on the Supreme Court.  “The rightward shift of the 
Court under Chief Justice Roberts is palpable,” Senator Chuck Schumer argued.  
35 Bernie Becker, Hatch Opposes Kagan, NEW YORK TIMES (July 2, 2010, 11:35 AM), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/hatch-opposes-kagan.  
36  David M. Herszenhorn, In Senate, Vote Nears on Kagan Nomination, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 4, 
2010), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501EFD8173FF937A3575BC0A9669D8B63.  
37  Oliphant, Senate Begins Debate, supra note 33. 
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“In decision after decision, special interests are winning out over ordinary 
citizens.  In decision after decision, this Court bends the law to suit an 
ideology.”38
The dueling Republican and Democratic assertions about the identity of 
the real political judges might simply be read as evidence of bipartisan support 
for the conventional ideal of impartial judicial decisionmaking.  After all, neither 
party invoked the idea of “political judging” as a form of praise and all senators 
describe their ideal member of the Court in conventional language of impartiality 
and principle.  The newspaper coverage argues against such a reading, however, 
by repeatedly suggesting that few of the senators really placed much stock in the 
conventional ideals they espoused.  Throughout the Judiciary Committee hearing 
“both sides prevailed upon Kagan to be the very thing that both sides say they 
decry:  a nominee with preformed views about the law.”
 
39  The newspapers 
consistently presented the Senators as being locked in a political battle whose 
lines had been drawn by the looming midterm elections.40
                                                        
38  Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Kagan Pledges Impartiality, Restraint as Justice, WASHINGTON POST 
(June, 28, 2010) (on file with author); see also Alec MacGillis & Amy Goldstein, Kagan Says That 
She Would Take a ‘Modest’ Approach on Supreme Court, WASHINGTON POST (June 29, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/28/AR2010062801859.html; 
E.J. Dionne, Whose Supreme Court is It?, WASHINGTON POST (June, 28, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/27/AR2010062703527.html.   
  In this context, 
39  Oliphant, Kagan Slips, supra note 28. 
40  See, e.g., James Oliphant, Elena Kagan’s Confirmation Hearing to Start Monday, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES (June 28, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/28/nation/la-na-kagan-hearings-
20100628. 
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senatorial exchanges were not a part of joint deliberations so much as they were 
efforts to score political points and placate key partisan constituencies.41
The political competition that galvanized the Senators diminished Kagan, 
pushing to her to the margins of a confirmation process that was ostensibly 
designed to focus on her.
 
42  The intense political competition also cast doubt on 
Kagan’s own professions of principle and impartiality.  Just as the senators were 
understood to be manipulating the process in order to promote political 
objectives on the bench and at the polls, Kagan was understood to be using the 
process to advance her own interest in getting confirmed.  She was repeatedly 
portrayed as carefully following a “script” that dictated her every gesture and 
comment.43
                                                        
41  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Confirmation is Likely, But Not G.O.P. Support, NEW YORK TIMES (July 2, 
2010), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9501E3D6123FF931A35754C0A9669D8B63&sec
=&spon=&pagewanted=all.  
  Her participation was simply an act, a show designed to secure her 
elevation to the high bench without revealing anything about the person on 
stage.  The senators seemed to recognize that Kagan’s heavily coached remarks 
42  Ashley Southall, The Early Word:  Kagan’s Confirmation Hearings, NEW YORK TIMES (June 28, 
2010, 7:25 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/the-early-word-kagans-
confirmation-hearings. 
43  Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, In 2nd Day of Quizzing, Kagan Sticks to Script, NEW 
YORK TIMES (July 1, 2010), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9401E2D6113CF932A35754C0A9669D8B63; 
Jonah Goldberg, Why the Kagan Hearings Will Be a Charade, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 29, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/29/opinion/la-oe-goldberg-kagan-20100629/2;  Dana 
Milbank, The Dodgy Miss Kagan, WASHINGTON POST (June 30, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/29/AR2010062904600.html; 
Anne E. Kornblut & Paul Kane, As Kagan Confirmation Hearings Begin, Republicans Struggle for 
Line of Attack, WASHINGTON POST (June 28, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/27/AR2010062703516.html; R. Jeffrey Smith, With Votes Looming, 
Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan Plays it Cool, WASHINGTON POST (July 11, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/10/AR2010071002816.html. 
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resembled the artificial, highly orchestrated statements that elected official 
themselves often make (“This is,” Senator Durbin observed, “an art form we 
have developed.” 44).  And yet senators of both parties also condemned the fact 
of Kagan’s performance as “a game of ‘hide the ball’.”45
 
  No one appeared to like 
evasion and pretense, including those whom acknowledged their dependence on 
these very devices. 
III. The Significance of Contradictory Images 
How should the Kagan confirmation process’s contradictory images of 
judging – images that map onto the conflicting perceptions that Americans 
generally have of the Supreme Court – be understood? 
Perhaps the most straightforward way to answer this question is to say 
that the public’s inconsistent views threaten judicial legitimacy.  As a leading 
scholar writes, “[t]he more that the public and their representatives think that 
judges generally – not just a particular judge or panel of judges in isolated cases 
– follow their political leanings instead of the law, the more likely it becomes that 
long-established [judicial] independence norms will be challenged with increasing 
intensity and will ultimately yield to calls for greater judicial accountability from 
                                                        
44  Paul Kane, Kagan Nomination Approved by Senate Judiciary Panel, WASHINGTON POST (July 20, 
2010, 1:12 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/20/AR2010072000559.html.  
45  Id. 
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Congress.”46  With a large segment of the public dubious about the impartiality 
of the courts’ decisions, it seems that the judiciary’s standing as an independent, 
authoritative arbiter of disputes is in danger, raising the specter of a coming age 
“where political officials tell judges how to decide cases.”47  Indeed, some 
commentators believe that we are already at the threshold of “a war of all 
against all within and through the law.”48  Without a rock-solid belief that the 
judiciary is limited by impartial principle, law will soon be “little more than the 
spoils that go to winners in contests among private interests who, by their 
victory, secure the prize of enlisting the coercive power of the legal apparatus to 
enforce their agenda.”49 Those who end up on the losing side of this bleak 
system will comply only because of fear of punishment and “out of the hope that 
they might prevail in future contests to take their turn to wield the law.”50
The newspaper coverage of the Kagan confirmation process explicitly 
raised this prospect of a significantly delegitimized judiciary.  After Kagan was 
confirmed by the Senate, Curt Levy of the Committee for Justice, a group that 
opposed confirmation, argued that political perceptions would continue to haunt 
Kagan on the bench:  “The confirmation process inevitably resulted in Kagan 
 
                                                        
46  CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF 
AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 263 (2006). 
47  Anthony Lewis, Afterword: The State of Judicial Independence, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION 
OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA, supra note 5, at 201. 
48  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 225 (2006). 
 
49  Id. 
50  Id.  
 21 
losing some legitimacy in the eyes of the public . . . [and that] will make 
Americans more skeptical of any controversial decisions she’s a part of.”51  In a 
similar spirit, Senator Amy Klobuchar openly worried that the sharp partisanship 
that marked the confirmation would substantially undermine “the people’s faith 
in the Court” as an independent and impartial body.52
Yet the newspaper coverage also contained some indications that the 
demise of judicial legitimacy was far from certain.  Although the confirmation 
process appeared to be a highly partisan affair with a belief in the political nature 
judging at its core, it is still the case that Americans consider the Supreme Court 
to be an impartial arbiter.  As Douglas Kendall observed, in the same news article 
where Levy and Klobuchar predicted the judiciary’s demise, “[Democratic 
senators] tried the same general strategy with the Alito nomination with a 
stronger case, higher stakes, and more media focus, and I don’t think very many 
Americans now view Alito to be an illegitimate justice.”
 
53
Opinion surveys similarly suggest that the politics of confirmation do not 
necessarily impugn the public’s perception of Court’s character.  As I noted 
earlier, a substantial plurality of Americans believes that political ideology infects 
Supreme Court decisionmaking even as a large majority of the public insists that 
   
                                                        
51  James Oliphant, Kagan Confirmed to Supreme Court Seat, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 5, 2010) 
(on file with author). 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
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political commitments ought to have no impact on the justices at all.54  The 
remarkable fact, however, is that the large gap between the expectation of 
political neutrality and the acknowledgement of political influence does not have 
a significant negative effect on overall evaluations of the Court.55
How can this be?
  The perception 
that justices may not actually operate according to the conventional dictates of 
impartiality does not seem to threaten public confidence in the Court after all. 
56
If we believe that people rely on the judicial process strictly as a source of 
principled and impartial adjudication, then the perception that judges may 
operate on the basis of partisan preference can only be corrosive.  Yet if we 
think that individuals not only may seek principled and impartial judgment, but 
also may wish merely to drape themselves in the mantle of principled 
impartiality, then a process beset by conflicting public beliefs makes a degree of 
sense.  The suspicion that judges might not conform to the conventional 
understanding of objective reasoning and fair judgment will still eat away public 
confidence.  At the same time, the suspicion of political judgment will also attract 
all those whom wish to merely dress up their preferences in the formal language 
  By way of conclusion, let me suggest how we can 
begin to think about a stable co-existence between appearances of impartial 
judgment and politically influenced decisionmaking. 
                                                        
54  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
55  Scheb & Lyons, supra note 17, at 186. 
56  I have developed an extensive answer to this question elsewhere.  See Bybee, supra note 2.   
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of law in the hope that this will allow their cause to look better than it actually is.  
Viewed from this perspective, law is a body of tests and procedures that 
asks individuals to seek impartial standards of judgment outside their own will 
while also creating an arena for the pursuit of personal interests and political 
attachments.  Such an arrangement may rightly be criticized for appearing 
unfair, unreasonable, and inconsistent.  But it is also an arrangement that may 
endure because it conforms to the contradictory desires of people who at once 
wish to have an neutral system of dispute resolution and want to ensure that 
their preferred side wins.   
Given this jumble of principle, politics, and posturing, it is no wonder that 
the Supreme Court confirmation process fails to coalesce around a single image 
of what judicial decisionmaking really is. 
